A 2-server Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme allows a user to retrieve the ith bit of an n-bit database replicated among two non-communicating servers, while not revealing any information about i to either server. In this work we construct a 2-server PIR scheme with total communication cost n O log log n log n
INTRODUCTION
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) was first introduced by Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz and Sudan [6] . In a k-server PIR scheme, a user can retrieve the ith bit ai of an n-bit database a = (a1, · · · , an) ∈ {0, 1} n replicated among k servers (which do not communicate) while giving no information about i to any server. The goal is to design PIR * Research supported by NSF grant CCF-1217416 and by the Sloan fellowship Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. STOC'15, June 14-17, 2015, Portland, Oregon, USA. Copyright is held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM. ACM 978-1-4503-3536-2/15/06 ...$15.00. http://dx.doi.org /10.1145/2746539.2746546. schemes that minimize the communication cost defined as the worst case number of bits transferred between the user and the servers in the protocol. The trivial solution which works even with one server is to make a server send the entire database a to the user, which has communication cost n.
When k = 1 the trivial solution cannot be improved [6] . But when k ≥ 2, the communication cost can be brought down significantly. In [6] , a 2-server PIR scheme with communication cost O(n 1/3 ) and a k-server PIR scheme with cost O k 2 log(k) · n 1/k were presented. The k-server PIR schemes were improved further in subsequent papers [1, 2, 3] . In [3] , a k-server PIR scheme with cost n O log log k k log k was obtained. Then, in a breakthrough result of Yekhanin [24] , the first 3-server scheme with sub-polynomial communication was given (assuming a number theoretic conjecture). Later, Efremenko [9] gave an unconditional k-server PIR scheme with sub-polynomial cost for k ≥ 3 which were slightly improved in [14, 5] . These new PIR schemes follow from the constructions of constant query smooth Locally Decodable Codes (LDCs) of sub-exponential length called Matching Vector Codes (MVCs). A k-query LDC [16] is an error correcting code which allows the receiver of a corrupted encoding of a message to recover the ith bit of the message using only k (random) queries. In a smooth LDC, each query of the reconstruction algorithm is uniformly distributed among the code word symbols. Given a k-query smooth LDC, one can construct a k-server PIR scheme by letting each server simulate one of the queries. For more information on the relation between PIR and LDC we refer to the survey [25] .
Despite the advances in 3-server PIR schemes, the 2-server PIR case remained stuck at O(n 1/3 ) communication. An explanation to the apparent n 1/3 barrier for 2-server PIR was given by Razborov and Yekhanin [21] who proved an Ω(n 1/3 ) lower bound for a restricted model of 2-server PIR called bilinear group based PIR which contains all the previously known constructions. This is in stark contrast to the best known 5 log n lower bound for general PIR schemes [22] . We elaborate more on the relation between this model and our construction after we present our results below.
PIR is extensively studied and there are several variants of PIR in literature. The most important variant with cryptographic applications is called Computationally Private Information Retrieval (CPIR). In CPIR, the privacy guarantee is based on computational hardness of certain functions i.e. a computationally bounded server cannot gain any in-formation about the user's query. In this case, non-trivial schemes exist even in the case of one server under some cryptographic hardness assumptions. For more information on these variants of PIR see [10, 11, 18, 20] . In this paper, we are only concerned with information theoretic privacy i.e. even a computationally unbounded server cannot gain any information about the user's query which is the strongest form of privacy.
Our Results
We start with a formal definition of a 2-server PIR scheme. A 2-server PIR scheme involves two servers S1 and S2 and a user U. A database a = (a1, · · · , an) ∈ {0, 1} n is replicated between the servers S1 and S2. We assume that the servers cannot communicate with each other. The user U wants to retrieve the ith bit of the database ai without revealing any information about i to either server. The following definition is from [6] :
Definition 1.1. A 2-server PIR protocol is a triplet of algorithms P = (Q, A, R). At the beginning of the protocol, the user U obtains a uniformly random string r. Next, U invokes Q(i, r) to generate a pair of queries (q1, q2). U sends q1 to S1 and q2 to S2. Each server Sj responds with an answer ansj = A(j, a, qj). Finally, U computes its output by applying the recovery algorithm R(ans1, ans2, i, r). The protocol should satisfy the following conditions:
• Correctness : For any n, a ∈ {0, 1} n and i ∈ [n], the user outputs the correct value of ai with probability 1 (where the probability is over random strings r) i.e. R(ans1, ans2, i, r) = ai.
• Privacy : Each server learns no information about i. That is, for any fixed database a and for j = 1, 2, the distributions of qj(i1, r) and qj(i2, r) are identical for all i1, i2 ∈ [n] when r is randomly chosen.
The communication cost of the protocol is the total number of bits exchanged between the user and the servers in the worst case.
k-server PIR is similarly defined, with the database replicated among k servers which cannot communicate between themselves. We only defined 1-round PIR i.e. there is only one round of interaction between the user and the servers. All known constructions of PIR schemes are 1-round and it is an interesting open problem to find if interaction helps. We now state our main theorem: Theorem 1. There exists a 2-server PIR scheme with communication cost n O log log n log n .
In [9] a 2 r -server PIR schemes was given with n O((log log n/log n) 1−1/r ) communication cost for any r ≥ 2. Using our techniques, we can reduce the number of servers in this scheme by a factor of two. That is, we prove the following stronger form of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. For any r ≥ 2, there exists a 2 r−1 -server PIR scheme with communication cost n O((log log n/log n) 1−1/r ) .
Other than the dramatic improvement for the 2-server case, Theorem 2 also gives a more modest improvement over known results in some range of the parameters. The 2 r query complexity of Matching Vector Codes in [9] was reduced to 9 · 2 r−4 for r ≥ 6 in [14] while keeping the encoding length the same. This was improved in [5] to 3 r/2 for 2 ≤ r ≤ 103 and ( 3 4 ) 51 · 2 r for r ≥ 104. Using these LDCs directly to get a PIR scheme is better than our scheme when the number of servers is more than 26, whereas our scheme is better than these when the number of servers are less than 9.
Related work
Lower bounds for bilinear group-based PIR In [21] , an Ω(n 1/3 ) lower bound was shown for a restricted model of 2-server PIR schemes. This lower bound holds for schemes that are both bilinear and group-based. Our scheme can be made into a bilinear scheme (see Section 4.1) over the field F3 of three elements (Our scheme can in fact be made linear and using a simple transformation given in [21] , any linear scheme can be converted to a bilinear scheme). However, it does not satisfy the property of being group-based as defined in [21] . Our scheme does satisfy a weaker notion of employing a group-based secret sharing scheme (another technical term defined in [21] ). The difference between these two notions (of being group-based as opposed to employing a group-based secret sharing scheme) is akin to the difference between LCCs and LDCs (LCCs being the stronger notion). In group-based PIR, the database is represented by the values of a function over a subset of a group but the user should be able to recover the value of that function at every group element. Our scheme encodes the database as a function over a group and the user will only be able to recover the bits of the database from the function.
2-query LDCs over large alphabet
The reader familiar with the exponential lower bounds for 2-query LDCs [17] would wonder why our construction does not violate these bounds. The reason is that, when one translates 2-server PIR schemes into LDC, the resulting alphabet of the code can be quite large. Formally, a scheme with communication cost s will translate into an LDC C :
(with the blocks corresponding to all possible answers by the servers). Thus, each one of the two queries used by the decoder is a string of s bits. The known lower bounds for such LDCs are exponential only as long as the block length s << log(n) and so our construction does not violate them. Hence, our main theorem also gives the first construction of a sub-exponential 2-query LDC over an alphabet of size 2 n o(1) .
Proof Overview
On a very high level, the new protocol combines the existing 2-server scheme of [23] , which uses polynomial interpolation using derivatives, with Matching Vector Codes (MV Codes) [24, 9] . In particular, we make use of the view of MV codes as polynomial codes, developed in [7] . This short overview is meant as a guide to the ideas in the construction (a detailed description will follow in the next sections). The 2-server scheme of [23] works by embedding the database a = (a1, . . . , an) as evaluations of a degree 3 polynomial F (x1, . . . , x k ) at n points P1, . . . , Pn ∈ F k q , with k ∼ n 1/3 and Fq a finite field. To recover the value ai = F (Pi) the user passes a random line through the point Pi, picks two random points Q1, Q2 on that line and sends the point Qj to the jth server. Each server responds with the value of F at Qj and the values of all partial derivatives ∂F/∂x , = 1, . . . , k at that point. The restriction of F to the line is a univariate degree 3 polynomial and the user can recover the values of this polynomial at two points as well as the value of its derivative at these points. These four values (two evaluations plus two derivatives) are enough to recover the polynomial and so its value at Pi. The user can compute the derivatives of the restricted polynomial from the partial derivatives of F (knowing the line equation) using the chain rule. The protocol is private since each query Qj is uniformly distributed in F k q and so independent of i. We now describe the PIR schemes of [24, 9] which are based on MV families. An MV family is a pair of lists U = (u1, . . . , un), V = (v1, . . . , vn) with each list element ui and vj belonging to Z k m and m is a small integer. These lists must satisfy the condition that ui, vj (taken mod m) is zero iff i = j. When m is a composite, say m = 6, one can construct such families of vectors of size n = k ω(1) [12] (this is impossible if m is prime). From such a family we can construct an m-server PIR scheme as follows: given a message a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ {0, 1} n define the polynomial
. We think of F as a polynomial with coefficients in some finite field Fq containing an element γ ∈ Fq of order m.
To recover ai the user picks a random z ∈ Z k m and consider the restriction of F to the 'multiplicative line' given by
In [7] it was observed that this restriction can be seen as a polynomial g(T ) of degree at most m − 1 in the new 'variable' T = γ t and so can be reconstructed from the m values on the line g(γ t ) = G(t), t = 0, 1, . . . , m − 1. The final observation is that g(0) is a nonzero multiple of ai (since the only contribution to the free coefficient comes from the monomial aix u i ) and so we can recover it if we know g(T ). Hence, the user can recover ai by asking the t'th (t = 0, 1, . . . , m − 1) server for the value G(t) = F (γ z+tv i ), which requires sending the uniformly random point z + tvi to the server. The communication cost is O(k) = n o(1) due to the super polynomial size of the MV family.
Our protocol extends the MV based protocol by asking each server for the evaluations of F at a point, as well as the values of a certain differential operator (similar to first order derivatives). For this to work we need two ingredients. The first is to replace the field Fq with a certain ring which has characteristic m and an element of order m (we only use m = 6 and can take the polynomial ring Zm[γ]/(γ 6 −1)). The second is an observation that, in known MV families constructions [12] , the inner products ui, vj that are nonzero (that is, when i = j) can be made to fall in a small set. More precisely, over Z6, the inner products are either zero or in the set {1, 3, 4}. This means that the restricted polynomial only has nonzero coefficients corresponding to powers of T coming from the set {0, 1, 3, 4}. Such a polynomial has four degrees of freedom and can be recovered from two evaluations and two derivatives (of order one). We are also able to work with arbitrary MV families by using derivatives up to second order at two points (which are sufficient to recover a degree 5 polynomial)(see Appendix 5).
Organization
In Section 2 we give some preliminary definitions and notations. In Section 3, we review the construction of a 2server PIR scheme with O(n 1/3 ) communication cost which is based on polynomial interpolation with partial derivatives [23] . In Section 4, we present our new 2-server scheme and prove Theorem 1. The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6 with some remarks on future directions.
PRELIMINARIES

Notation
We will use bold letters like x, u, v, z etc. to denote vectors. The inner product between two vectors u = (u1,
For a commutative ring, R we will denote by R[x1, · · · , x k ] the ring of polynomials in formal variables x1, . . . , x k with coefficients in R. We will use the notation
, 1, · · · , m − 1} k is the unique vector such that u ≡ũ mod m. Fq denotes the finite field of size q.
The rings Rm,r
For our construction it will be convenient (although not absolutely necessary, see Section 4.1) to work over a ring which has characteristic 6 and contains an element of order 6. We now discuss how to construct such a ring in general.
Let m > 1 be an integer and let γ be a formal variable. We denote by Rm,r = Zm[γ]/(γ r − 1) the ring of univariate polynomials Zm[γ] in γ with coefficients in Zm modulo the identity γ r = 1. More formally, each element f ∈ Rm,r is represented by a degree ≤ r − 1 polynomial f (γ) = r−1 =0 c γ with coefficients c ∈ Zm. Addition is done as in Zm[γ] (coordinate wise modulo m) and multiplication is done over Zm[γ] but using the identity γ r = 1 to reduce higher order monomials to degree ≤ r − 1. It is easy to see that this reduction is uniquely defined: to obtain the coefficient of γ we sum all the coefficients of powers of γ that are of the form + kr for some integer k ≥ 0. This implies the following lemma. Remark 2.2. For any t ∈ {0, 1, · · · , r − 1}, γ t is not a zero divisor in the ring Rm,r. This holds since the coefficients of γ t · f (γ) are the same as those of f (γ) (shifted cyclically t positions).
The rings Rm,r are sometimes denoted by Zm[Cr] and referred to as the group ring of the cyclic group Cr with coefficients in Zm. See e.g., [15, 13] for some recent applications of these rings in cryptography.
Matrices over Commutative Rings
Let R be a commutative ring (with unity). Let M ∈ R n×n be an n × n matrix with entries from R. Most of the classical theory of determinants can be derived in this setting in exactly the same way as over fields. One particularly useful piece of this theory is the adjugate (or classical adjoint) matrix. For an n × n matrix M ∈ R n×n the adjugate matrix is denoted by adj(M ) ∈ R n×n and has the (j, i)-cofactor of A as its (i, j)th entry (recall that the (i, j)-cofactor is the determinant of the matrix obtained from M after removing the ith row and jth column multiplied by (−1) i+j ). A basic fact in matrix theory is the following identity. The way we will use this fact is as follows:
Remark 2.4. Suppose M ∈ R n×n has nonzero determinant and let a = (a1, . . . , an) t ∈ R n be some column vector where a1 = 0 or a1 = c and c is not a zero-divisor. Then we can determine the value of a1 (i.e., tell whether its 0 or c) from the product M · a. The way to do it is to multiply M · a from the left by adj(M ) and to look at the first entry. This will give us det(M ) · a1 which is zero iff a1 is (since det(M ) · c is always nonzero). 
Matching Vector Families
If S is omitted, it implies that S = Zm \ {0}.
Theorem 2.6 (Theorem 1.4 in [12] ). Let m = p1p2 · · · pr where p1, p2 · · · , pr are distinct primes with r ≥ 2, then there exists an explicitly constructible S-matching vector family F in Z k m of size n ≥ exp Ω
Remark 2.7. The size of S in the above theorem is 2 r −1 by the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Thus, there are matching vector families of size super-polynomial in the dimension of the space with inner products restricted to a set of size 2 r = |S ∪ {0}|.
In the special case when p1 = 2, p2 = 3, we have m = 6 and the following corollary: There are several known constructions of 2-server PIR with O(n 1/3 ) communication cost. We will recall here in detail a particular construction due to [23] which uses polynomial interpolation using derivatives (over a field). In the next section we will replace the field with a ring and see how to use matching vector families to reduce the communication cost.
Let a = (a1, · · · , an) be the database, choose k to be smallest integer such that n ≤ k 3 . Let Fq be a finite field with q > 3 elements and suppose for simplicity that q is prime (so that partial derivatives behave nicely for polynomials of degree at most 3). Let φ : [n] → {0, 1} k ⊂ F k q be an embedding of the n coordinates into points in {0, 1} k of Hamming weight 3. Such an embedding exists since n ≤ k
. Fix any two nonzero field elements t1 = t2 ∈ Fq \ {0}.
Suppose the user U wants to recover the bit aτ . The protocol is as follows: The user picks a uniformly random element z ∈ F k q and sends φ(τ ) + t1z to S1 and φ(τ ) + t2z to S2. Each server Si then replies with the value of F at the point received F (φ(τ ) + tiz) as well as the values of the k partial derivatives of F at the same point
The partial derivatives here are defined in the same way as for polynomials over the real numbers. The protocol is private since φ(τ ) + tz is uniformly distributed in F k q for any τ and t = 0. Consider the univariate polynomial
Observe that, by the chain rule,
Thus the user can recover the values g(t), g (t) for t = t1, t2 from the server's responses. From this information the user needs to find g(0) = F (φ(τ )) = aτ . Since F is a degree 3 polynomial, g(t) is a univariate degree 3 polynomial, let g(t) = 3 =0 c t . Therefore we have the following matrix equation:
The matrix M has determinant det(M ) = (t2 − t1) 4 and so M is invertible as long as t1 = t2. Thus the user can find c0 = g(0) = F (φ(τ )) = aτ by multiplying by the inverse of M .
The communication cost of this protocol is O(k) = O(n 1/3 ) since the user sends a vector in F k q to each server and each server sends an element in Fq and a vector in F k q to the user.
THE NEW 2-SERVER SCHEME
In this section we describe our main construction which proves Theorem 1. Before describing the construction we set up some of the required ingredients and notations. The first ingredient is a matching vector family over Z6 as in Corollary 2.8. That is, we construct an S = {1, 3, 4}-matching vector family F = (U, V) where U = (u1, · · · , un), V = (v1, · · · , vn) have elements in Z k 6 . Corollary 2.8 tells us that this can be done with n = exp(Ω(log 2 k/ log log k)) or k = exp(O √ log n log log n ). We will work with polynomials over the ring R = R6,6 = Z6[γ]/(γ 6 − 1) (see Section 2). We will denote the vector (γ z 1 , γ z 2 , · · · , γ z k ) by γ z where z = (z1, · · · , z k ) ∈ Z k 6 . We will need to extend the notion of partial derivatives to polynomials in R[x1, . . . , x k ]. This will be a non-standard definition, but it will satisfy all the properties we will need. Instead of defining each partial derivative separately, we define one operator that will include all of them.
Definition 4.1. Let R be a commutative ring and let
For example, when F (x1, x2) = x 2 1 x2 + 4x1x2 + 3x 2 2 (with integer coefficients),
One can think of F (1) both as a polynomial with coefficients in R k as well as a k-tuple of polynomials in R[x1, . . . , x k ]. This will not matter much since the only operation we will perform on F (1) is to evaluate it at a point in R k .
The Protocol
Let a = (a1, a2 · · · , an) ∈ {0, 1} n be an n-bit database shared by two servers S1 and S2. The user U wants to find the bit aτ without revealing any information about τ to either server. For the rest of this section, R = R6,6 = Z6[γ]/(γ 6 −1). The servers represent the database as a polynomial F (x) ∈ R[x] = R[x1, · · · , x k ] given by
where U = (u1, . . . , un) are given by the matching vector family F = (U, V).
The user samples a uniformly random z ∈ Z k 6 and then sends z + t1vτ to S1 and z + t2vτ to S2 where we fix t1 = 0 and t2 = 1 (other choices of values would also work). Si then responds with the value of F at the point γ z+t i vτ , that is with F (γ z+t i vτ ) and the value of the 'first order derivative' at the same point F (1) (γ z+t i vτ ). Notice that the protocol is private since z + tvτ is uniformly distributed over Z k 6 for any fixed τ and t.
U : Picks a uniformly random z ∈ Z k 6 U → Si : z + tivτ
Using the fact that γ 6 = 1, we can rewrite G(t) as:
with each c ∈ R given by
we can conclude that c0 = aτ γ uτ ,z and c2 = c5 = 0. Therefore
Next, consider the polynomial
By definition we have
where the last equality holds since c2 = c5 = 0 and
So the user can find the values of g(γ t ), g (1) (γ t ) for t = t1, t2. Since t1 = 0, t2 = 1, we obtain the following matrix equation:
The determinant (over R) of the matrix M is det(M ) = γ(γ − 1) 4 (γ 2 + 4γ + 1) = 3γ 5 + 4γ 4 + 3γ 3 + 2γ (2) and so, by Lemma 2.1, is a nonzero element of the ring R. Since c0 = aτ γ uτ ,z , either c0 = 0 or c0 = γ uτ ,z which is not a zero-divisor by Remark 2.2. Hence, by Remark 2.4, the user can find whether c0 = 0 from the vector [g(1), g (1) (1), g(γ), g (1) (γ)] t by multiplying it from the left by adj(M ). Since c0 = aτ γ uτ ,z , aτ will be zero iff c0 is and so the user can recover aτ ∈ {0, 1}.
Communication Cost
The user sends a vector in Z k 6 to each server. Each server sends a element of R and a vector in R k to the user. Since elements of R have constant size description, the total communication cost is O(k) = n O log log n log n = n o(1) .
Working over Z6 or F3
Using the ring R6,6 = Z6[γ]/(γ 6 −1) in the above construction makes the presentation clearer but is not absolutely necessary. Observing the proof, we see that one can replace it with any ring R as long as there is a homomorphism from R6,6 to R such that the determinant of the matrix M (Eq. 2) doesn't vanish under this homomorphism.
For example, we can work over the ring Z6 and use the element −1 as a substitute for γ. Since (−1) 6 = 1 all of the calculations we did with γ carry through. In addition, the resulting determinant of M is non zero when setting γ = −1 and so we can complete the recovery process. More formally, define the homomorphism τ : Z6[γ]/(γ 6 −1) → Z6 by extending the identity homomorphism on Z6 using τ (γ) = −1. Observe that the determinant of the matrix M in Eq. 2 doesn't vanish under this homomorphism, τ (det(M )) = −4 = 2.
A more interesting example is the ring of integers modulo 3, which we denote by F3 to highlight that it is also a field. We can use the homomorphism φ : Z6[γ]/(γ 6 − 1) → F3 by extending the natural homomorphism from Z6 to F3 (given by reducing each element modulo 3) using φ(γ) = −1. Again the determinant in Eq. 2 doesn't vanish. This also shows that our scheme can be made to be bilinear, as defined in [21] , since the answers of each server become linear combinations of database entries over a field and the recovered bit is also a linear combination of the answers of each server.
GENERALIZATION TO MORE SERVERS
In this section we will prove Theorem 2. We will allow the database symbols to belong to a slightly larger alphabet Zm. Let q = 2 r−1 denote the number of servers S1, · · · , Sq for some r ≥ 2. Let m = p1p2 · · · pr where p1, p2, · · · , pr are distinct primes. By Theorem 2.6, there is an explicit S-matching vector family F = (U, V) of size n and dimension k = n O((log log n/ log n) 1−1/r ) where S = {a ∈ Zm : a mod pi ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i ∈ [r]} \ {0}. By Remark 2.7, |S ∪ {0}| = 2 r = 2q.
The Protocol:.
We will work over the ring R = Rm,m = Zm[γ]/(γ m − 1). The servers represent the database a = (a1, · · · , an) ∈ Z n m as a polynomial F (x) ∈ R[x] = R[x1, · · · , x k ] given by
The user samples a uniformly random z ∈ Z k m and then sends z + tivτ to Si for i ∈ [q] where ti = i − 1. Si then responds with the value of F at the point γ z+t i vτ , that is with F (γ z+t i vτ ) and the value of the 'first order derivative' at the same point F (1) (γ z+t i vτ ). Notice that the protocol is private since z + tvτ is uniformly distributed over Z k m for any fixed τ and t. Recovery:.
Similar to the 2-server recovery, we define 
Hence, the user can calculate the values of g(γ t ), g (1) (γ t ) for t = t1, · · · , tq and we end up with the following (square) system of equations:
. . .
where the 2 r = 2q columns are indexed by ∈ {0} ∪ S. Instead of computing the determinant (and the adjugate matrix), we will use the following lemma (proven below).
Lemma 5.1. There exists a row vector λ = [α1, β1, · · · , αq, βq] ∈ R 2q such that λM = [µ, 0, · · · , 0] for some µ ∈ R where µ mod pi = 0 ∀i ∈ [r].
Using this lemma, the user can recover aτ as follows. We have
Taking this equation modulo pi we get, (ν mod pi) = (µc0 mod pi) = (µ mod pi)(aτ mod pi)γ uτ ,z .
Let µ = m−1 j=0 µjγ j and ν = m−1 j=0 νjγ j . Since µ mod pi = 0, there exists j such that µj mod pi = 0. So (aτ mod pi) = (µj mod pi) −1 (ν j+ uτ ,z mod pi). So we can find aτ mod pi for each i ∈ [r]. Finally we use Chinese Remainder Theorem to find aτ ∈ Zm.
To prove Lemma 5.1, we will need the following simple number-theoretic lemma. Recall that the order of an element a in a finite multiplicative group G is the smallest integer w ≥ 1 so that a w = 1.
Lemma 5.2. Let Fp be a field of prime order p and let k ≥ 1 be an integer co-prime to p. Then, the algebraic closure of Fp contains an element ζ of order k.
Proof. Since k, p are co-prime, p ∈ Z * k which is the multiplicative group of invertible elements in Z k . Let w ≥ 1 be the order of p in the group Z * k , so k divides p w − 1. Consider the extension field Fpw , which is a sub field of the algebraic closure of Fp. The multiplicative group F * p w of this field is a cyclic group of size p w − 1. Since k divides this size, there must be an element in Fpw of order k.
Proof of Lemma 5.1
For any λ = [α1, β1, · · · , αq, βq] ∈ R 2q we can define a function h : S ∪ {0} → R as:
Our goal is then to construct an h of this form such that
Notice that, by Chinese Remaindering,
where we recall that Rp i ,m = Zp i [γ]/(γ m −1). Therefore, we also get that, for a formal variable x, the rings of univariate polynomials also satisfy In other words, any family of polynomials fi ∈ Rp i ,m[x], i ∈ [r] can be 'lifted' to a single polynomial f ∈ R[x] so that (f mod pi) = fi for all i (reducing f mod pi is done coordinate-wise). Moreover, since this lift is done coefficientwise (using Eq. 3), we get that the degree of f is equal to the maximum of the degrees of the fi's.
We begin by constructing, for each i ∈ [r] the following polynomial fi(x) ∈ Rp i ,m[x]:
The degree of fi is 2 r−1 −1 = q−1 so, by the above comment, we can find a polynomial f (x) ∈ R[x] of degree q − 1 such that f (x) ≡ fi(x) mod pi for all i ∈ [r]. Define αi, i ∈ [q] to be the coefficients of the polynomial f so that f (x) = q i=1 αix i−1 . Since we defined ti = i − 1, we have f (x) = 
for some polynomial θ(x) ∈ Fp j [x]. The above equation is an identity in the ring Fp j [x]. So we can check its validity by substituting values for x from the algebraic closure of Fp j . Let m = m/pj and let ζ be an element in the algebraic closure of Fp j of order m (so ζ = 1 iff m divides ). Since m and pj are co-prime, such an element exists by Lemma 5.2. If we substitute ζ into Eq. 4, the RHS is zero (since m divides m). However, each term in the LHS product is nonzero, since if = 0 mod pj and m divides then = 0 mod m but we know that 0 / ∈ S. Since we are working over the algebraic closure of Fp j which is a field, the product of nonzero elements is nonzero. This is a contradiction, and so Eq. 4 does not hold.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this work we presented the first 2-server PIR scheme with sub-polynomial cost. It is unclear what is the optimal communication cost of 2-server schemes and we conjecture that our protocol is far from optimal. Clearly, a construction of MV families in Z k 6 of larger size will immediately give better 2-server PIR schemes. There is very little known about the limitations of this approach and current upper
